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Abstract. Alert correlation is a system which receives alerts from heterogene-
ous Intrusion Detection Systems and reduces false alerts, detects high level pat-
terns of attacks, increases the meaning of occurred incidents, predicts the future 
states of attacks, and detects root cause of attacks. To reach these goals, many 
algorithms have been introduced in the world with many advantages and disad-
vantages. In this paper, we are trying to present a comprehensive survey on al-
ready proposed alert correlation algorithms. The approach of this survey is 
mainly focused on algorithms in correlation engines which can work in enter-
prise and practical networks. Having this aim in mind, many features related to 
accuracy, functionality, and computation power are introduced and all algorithm 
categories are assessed with these features. The result of this survey shows that 
each category of algorithms has its own strengths and an ideal correlation 
frameworks should be carried the strength feature of each category.  
Keywords: Network Security, Intrusion Detection System, Alert, Alert Correla-
tion, Attack Scenario, Similarity-based, Knowledge-based, Statistical-based. 
1 Introduction 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) contains a widespread set of software or hard-
ware whose mission is to detect improper behaviors by receiving information from 
their network. In terms of data processing types, such systems are divided into two 
categories: Anomaly-based and Misuse-based IDSs. Anomaly-based IDSs detect ab-
normal behaviors by checking statistical information about system execution and 
maintains normal behavioral patterns. Misuse-based IDSs maintain suspicious or at-
tack patterns categories. Whenever the received information is in correspondence with 
the IDS signature or in contradiction with normal behavioral patterns, an alert is gen-
erated. Nowadays, many networks use such systems either commercially or open 
source versions. However, problems such as bad parameter settings and inappropriate 
IDS tuning which should be dealt with in a higher level [1]. The existence of such 
problems makes the alert processing system necessary. Such problems are as follows: 
• Large amount of alerts: One of the very crucial problems of using intrusion 
detection systems is the large number of generated alerts by these systems. The 
  
main reasons for this large number of alerts might be imprecise incident defini-
tion, incompatibility in network, and sometimes number of real intrusions or il-
legal behaviors, which tend to mislead the system supervisor from the main at-
tack or the attack goal. Anyhow, the usual number of alerts is too much to ena-
ble the system supervisor checking all of them manually. As a result, only a 
portion of them is checked. 
• Heterogeneous alerts: The supervisor usually receives a wide range of alerts 
from different sensors and different sensors generate alerts with different for-
mats. Hence, in order to process the alerts, it is required to normalize them. 
• False alerts and unidentified incidents: In all types of intrusion detection sys-
tems, false in detection are made due to the lack of information describing inci-
dents and inaccuracy of the attack pattern. Thus, a very useful activity of higher 
level systems is to detect mistakes made by IDSs, and correcting mistakes as 
much as possible. These mistakes are divided into two categories: wrong re-
ports of illegal or unusual events which even have not occurred or their occur-
rence has been unsuccessful; and unreported events which must be reported.  
• Inability in connecting current alerts with the previous ones: Nowadays, 
most attacks are sequential activities, which the intruders provide many phases 
for reaching their goals. Detecting such connections among the attack phases is 
sometimes very difficult, as the pattern of the first attack stage is not necessari-
ly unique all the time and is not definitely determinable. On one hand, some at-
tacks might not be successful due to unusual reasons or the attacker does not 
some parts of attack due to having direct information sources. On the other 
hand, the attacker might take another step of an attack in spite of the unsuccess-
ful previous step. Being able to detect several patterns, the system supervisor 
would have the ability to predict the next attack step and can stop the attack be-
fore it reaches its goal. 
• Not providing the reliability level and alert priorities: The existence of 
comprehensive factors for evaluating an alert importance and reliability will 
ease prioritizing assessments for system supervisors. But, many intrusion detec-
tion systems do not report a factor for the reliability of generated alerts, and in 
cases of provided criteria, the presented results are not comparable with other 
recourse results due to the lack of common standardization among all resources. 
On the other hand, the importance of an alert depends on the target importance 
which is not related to the IDSs. So, if a higher level system is able to assess the 
alert importance and priorities, it would be a valuable help to system adminis-
trators to choose alert priorities correctly. 
To fulfill these requirements, Alert Correlation Systems are introduced. In the sim-
plest manner, an alert correlation engine functions exactly as the derived meaning of 
the word “correlation”. In fact it correlates alerts in a way that a new meaning is de-
rived. Sometimes the number of events is so many that its manual analysis is impossi-
ble. In such cases, the correlation engine can reduce a large amount of information to 
a manageable rate. In addition, it can identify malicious activities from an overall and 
abstract view, instead of analyzing each alert separately. In other words, an alert cor-
  
relation system is a system which receives incidents from various heterogeneous sys-
tems, reduces the required information for assessments, removes false alerts, and de-
tects high level attack patterns. 
Different algorithms have been introduced in alert correlation. To the best of our 
knowledge, some surveys have been presented. The first research [2] made a deep 
review on published papers and available tools with the aim of explaining some dif-
ferences between them. In another research [3], presented a mapping among frame-
work components and proposed techniques. In this survey, we aim to present taxono-
my in which the weaknesses and strengths of previous proposed algorithms are ex-
plained. The emphasis of our survey is on some features which help correlation en-
gine designer to propose a more accurate, practical, extendable, and low cost compu-
tation power. We believe that our approach gives a better understanding of this area as 
more literature works are presented and the blind area related to algorithms benefits 
will be kindled. 
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we provide a gen-
eral categorization on alert correlation algorithms. Each category is completely intro-
duced and its advantages and disadvantages are explained in Section 3, 4, and 5. In 
Section 6, we compare different algorithms based on various factors and we present 
conclusion and future work in Section 7. 
2 Alert Correlation Algorithms 
Alert correlation algorithms can be divided into three categories based on their char-
acteristics: 1) Similarity-based, 2) Knowledge-based and 3) Statistical-based [4]. The 
similarity-based and statistical-based algorithms need less context information and 
they are able to correlate only based on similarities between alert features and learned 
information from previous steps whereas knowledge-based algorithms completely 
perform base on alert meanings. It has to be known that this categorization is not 
completely precise and some algorithms are on the edge between two categories. 
Thus, assigning an algorithm to a category is based on the fact that the algorithm has 
the most similarity to which one. Each category is introduced in the following sub-
sections and in next sections the most important algorithms will be described. 
2.1 Similarity-based Algorithms 
The basis for this category of algorithms is defining factor to compare the similarity 
of either two alerts or an alert with a cluster of alerts (meta-alert). If an alert or meta-
alert has needed similarity, each one of them is merged with the alert or meta-alert 
and otherwise a new meta-alert is created. Thus, the goal of these algorithms is to 
cluster similar alerts in time. The most important advantage of these algorithms is that 
there is no need for precise definition of attack types. Moreover, the correlation can be 
done only with definition of similarity factors for alerts features. 
Three main subcategories are assumed for these types of algorithms. The first sub-
category is based on defining very simple rules for expressing relations between 
  
alerts. The second subcategory is presented with the goal of identifying basic draw-
backs in the network structure. The third subdirectory includes algorithms which pro-
duce comparison factors using models based on machine learning. In the following 
subsections, different researches in each subcategory will be described. 
2.2 Knowledge-based Algorithms 
This category is based on a knowledge base of attack definitions. Algorithms existing 
in this category are divided into two main subcategories: 1) Pre-requisites and Conse-
quences and 2) Scenario. The basis of Pre-requisites and Consequences algorithms is 
on the definition of pre-requisites and possible occurring results. Thus, each incident 
is chained to other incidents by a network of conjunction and disjunction combina-
tions and generates the possible network of attacks. Hence, this idea is placed in an 
higher level than correlation based on features similarities and in a lower level than 
combining based on pre-defined attack patterns. Although these algorithms do not 
require precise definition for each attack scenario like scenario-based algorithms, the 
previous knowledge is necessary for determining pre-requisites and all existing inci-
dent results. Scenario algorithms are based on the idea that many intrusions include 
various steps which must run one by one to success the attack. Thus, low level alerts 
can be compared with pre-defined intrusion steps and correlate a sequence of alerts 
related to each attack. Thus, a set of different attack scenarios definitions exist in a 
knowledge base in this type of algorithm. A list of current attack scenarios are main-
tained when the correlation system is operating, which this list includes all scenarios 
that at least one step of them are done recently. By the arrival of a new alert, it is 
compared to the current scenario and if the possibility is more than a certain threshold, 
it will attach to the scenario. Otherwise, if the alert is compatible with one of the pos-
sible scenario definitions inside the knowledge base, a new current scenario is gener-
ated using this alert. The main challenge for these algorithms is definition of attack 
scenarios even with existing automatic attack scenario learning methods. Also, these 
algorithms are completely deficient against new attacks. 
2.3 Statistical-based Algorithms 
The basic idea of these algorithms is that relevant attacks have similar statistical at-
tributes and a proper categorization can be found by detecting these similarities. These 
types of algorithms store causal relationships between different incidents and analyses 
their occurred frequencies in the system education period using previous data statisti-
cal analysis and then attack steps are generated. After learning these relationships and 
being confirmed by the supervisor, this knowledge is used for correlating different 
attack stages. Pure statistical algorithms do not have any prior knowledge on attack 
scenarios. But scientific results indicate that using these algorithms is possible only in 
very specific domains in which domain attributes are taken in account of designing 
algorithms and otherwise, high error rate exist. In addition, combining data using this 
algorithm is impossible if the previous sensors provide incomplete or abnormal in-
formation. This category is also divided into three subcategories. The first subcatego-
  
ry’s goal is to detect alerts which are regularly repeated and finding their repetition 
pattern. The purpose of the second subcategory is estimating causal relationships be-
tween alerts, predicting next alert occurrence, and detecting attacks and the third sub-
category’s goal is combining reliability with completely similar alerts. 
2.4 Assessment 
To be able to describe the advantages and disadvantages of algorithms and assess 
their functionalities, we extracted several factors and explained each algorithm based 
on these factors. Important factors for this assessment are: 
1. Algorithm Capability: Expected capabilities in algorithms are: Alert Verifica-
tion, Similar Alert Clustering, Attack Sequence Detection, and Repeti-
tive/Unimportant Alert Reduction. 
2. Algorithm Accuracy: As this system is to omit incorrect alerts and combine a 
large number of them with the aim of expressing a summary of system states, it 
should have a significant exactness of errors and not to ignore any event by 
mistake. 
3. Algorithm Computation Power: According to the high amount of calculation 
for correlation engine and necessity of fast and online correlation, it is neces-
sary to assess memory usage and processing power of algorithms. 
4. Required Knowledge Base: It is necessary to know the required information for 
each algorithm, from where this data is extracted and whether all the required 
data is accessible according to local presented system conditions. 
5. Algorithm Extendibility and Flexibility: How much and how is the algorithm 
performance procedure changeable, localizable and adaptable to new condi-
tions, by the user. 
3 Similarity-based Algorithms 
3.1 Simple Rules 
The main idea of this subcategory can be seen in EMERALD product [5]. The func-
tionality of this idea is based on defining very simple rules to express relations among 
alert features which can be combined together. In this subcategory, algorithms try to 
define simple rules in order to compute similarity between attributes of alerts and find 
the relation. 
The significant works are presented in [5], [6], [7], [8], and [9]. The major required 
knowledge for this style of correlation rules are rule structures and required functions 
for checking similarity. Thus, these algorithms do not rely so much on knowledge 
bases. These algorithms can be used in different hierarchical levels and alerts are cor-
related form various aspects. In the detecting attack sequence capability, these algo-
rithms include limits for defining attack types and can only detect sequences specified 
based on attack class. If the pattern definition is in a form that partitions conditions of 
  
the domain of that alert which alerts can be combined together into separate sets, it 
can also allocate input data to parallel processors for each pattern based on these con-
ditions. Thus, these algorithms have a very good parallelism capability. These algo-
rithms require maintaining all generated meta-alerts in the current time window for 
each pattern. Thus, its required memory is linearly proportional to alert input rate 
multiplied by the time window length. 
3.2 Hierarchical Rules 
This subcategory includes algorithms which have formed abstraction levels hierarchi-
cally and it makes decisions about security event detections based on these abstraction 
levels. This set of algorithms introduces researches that express similarity factors in a 
hierarchical of concept generalization. 
The methods presented in [10], [11] and [12] are examples of such algorithms 
which is designed to detect root causes in networks. These algorithms include a meth-
od for comparing alert values, with a linear calculation degree proportional to general-
ization hierarchy tree depths. The required memory for these algorithms is also linear 
and equivalent to generalization tree sizes. Previous knowledge requirement level in 
these algorithms is up to defining generalization trees and thus precise and deep net-
work structure and elements knowledge is not necessary, except in case of needing 
definition for address values and attack classes hierarchy. 
3.3 Machine Learning 
The last subcategory is algorithms in which comparison factors are generated auto-
matically. Pre-requisite for supervised algorithms is the existence of a set of clustered 
alerts which the learning algorithm can set the parameters of its decision making 
model based on them. Algorithms without such a requirement (unsupervised), give the 
responsibility for training how to measure similarity to the algorithm. Three branches 
are considered for this type of algorithms. 
In the first branch, the algorithms presented in [13] and [14] cluster alerts based on 
decision tree learning by previous data features. This algorithm exists in single-step 
and multi-step clustering (detecting similar alerts and attack sequences). This algo-
rithm requires a huge and comprehensive set of training examples for creating a deci-
sion tree about how to perform correlation and in case that this set is incomplete, there 
is no guarantee for the correct performance of this algorithm. In terms of the required 
processing resources amount, it is similar to simple comparison algorithms, because 
each new alert must be compared to all meta-alerts existing in the current time win-
dow and the comparison procedure must be carried out with one decision tree with 
linear time cost. The necessary comparison structure makes it possible to divide the 
algorithm to few processors for comparing meta-alerts existing in the memory. Also 
based on the generated decision tree, partitioning input alerts and dividing them be-
tween different processors also might exist before correlation. Flexibility, compatibil-
ity with new conditions and extendibility are very hard in this algorithm and need pre-
training the decision tree with new data. 
  
In the second branch, the algorithms presented in [15] and [16] perform alert clus-
tering based on alert Reconstruction Error by a neural network. The application of this 
algorithm is in single-step clustering and decision making based on cluster statistics. 
The only previous knowledge used in this algorithm is a set of alerts and it does not 
use any knowledge base and so, not using any environmental knowledge makes it 
hard to rely on the detection precision of this algorithm. In terms of required pro-
cessing power and comparison modularity, this algorithm is very fast and simple, 
because of the arriving of each alert; it calculates the reconstruction error, completely 
independent from existing meta-alerts in the system. In case of re-learning with new 
condition data sets, still there is no guarantee for algorithm behavior change, because 
the used training model only focuses on alert re-creation precision and previous mis-
takes do not help the re-learning precision and new data might not have much impact 
on the new generalization model. 
In the last branch, the algorithms described in [17] and [18] learn and apply true 
and false alert patterns based on labeled data by the system supervisor. The algorithm 
has online training capability and very good flexibility and its decision making factors 
are mostly based on information related to similar alerts in time ranges close to new 
alert arriving. Due to dependency of decision making about each alert to a wide range 
of similar alert statistical features, partitioning this algorithm is only possible if limit-
ing under observation alert features to specific clusters capable of being partitioned 
and it is done in each unit centralized and without parallelism. This can also be men-
tioned for the used memory. Each executive unit in this algorithm must whether main-
tain statistical information related to all clusters of its own processor in the memory 
which is practically impossible, or check close similar cases in the permanent storage 
resource for each decision making. Thus, it requires a lot of access to one of the two 
permanent or temporary memories. 
4 Knowledge-based Algorithms 
4.1 Prerequisites/Consequences 
The algorithms in this subcategory observe and control meanings of alerts and exist-
ing concepts in the network and then detect a security event. In addition, makes ex-
tracting and forming a relation between different attack stages possible, with the pre-
assumption of knowing a knowledge base which describes all existing prerequi-
sites/consequences of an alert, and a database describing the network configurations 
and structure. 
One of the first algorithms in using the background knowledge has been proposed 
in [19]. Following this idea, a model with a simpler and applicable expression has 
been proposed in [20], [21], [22] and [23]. In these algorithms, alerts are modeled 
using first order logic and causal relationships are defined for backgrounds, and con-
sequences of each event. Thus, a graph of possible alerts and relationships between 
them can be created and provide appropriate tools to reduce the amount of infor-
mation shown to the user. To continue, some researches expanded the mentioned tools 
  
to identify attack scenarios, analyzed the attack procedure [24] [25] [26] and also 
detected lost components of an attack [27] [28]. 
In terms of the reliance amount on environmental knowledge, these algorithms 
have the most requirements and in contrast, generate conclusion outputs without any 
bias and completely based on real alert meanings. Given that these algorithms do not 
use any pre-assumed information in addition to default environmental knowledge, 
they are very flexible and extendable algorithms and the algorithms behavior changes 
in real time with any change in the environmental knowledge. In addition,  
In cases of required processing power, unity, parallelism ability and required pre-
vious data, these algorithms are in the heaviest existing algorithms range, because on 
one hand with the arrival of each new alert, any kind of its relationship with all other 
alerts in the active time window must be checked and this task needs a huge amount 
of adjustments between alert types, prerequisites/consequences, and their information 
details like source and destination address. On the other hand, because these algo-
rithms are performing around meanings, continuous maintaining and updating a lot of 
incidents for different resources can play a very important role in the algorithm preci-
sion. Algorithm presented in [19], [20], [21], [22], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29] and 
[23] limit the user checking domain to overcome processing problems and making the 
resulting data usable. In [30] [31] [32] another method is introduced which solves the 
problem of requiring processing power by sacrificing the memory. 
4.2 Scenario 
The main application of this set of algorithms is detecting multi-step attacks and their 
reliance is on the existence scenario of these kinds of attacks. Some of these works are 
presented in [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38] and [39]. Various languages are present-
ed for describing these scenarios but the main idea in all of them is specifying attack 
steps and prerequisites and its goals. Thus, in terms of required amount of environ-
mental knowledge, this set of algorithms require a higher level of knowledge than pre-
requisites and results-based algorithms, but this knowledge can have less amount and 
domain. So, required processing resources in this branch is based on defined rules, 
can be less than the pre-requisites and results-based algorithms. But due to the very 
wide range of possible cases, unitizing and paralleling will be difficult. In case of 
defining a context language for expressing scenarios, these algorithms are completely 
flexible and extendable, because the system behavior must change in real time accord-
ing to any change or extension in rules. The required memory for detecting scenarios 
rises according to the number of defined scenarios and required time window. 
5 Statistical-based Algorithms 
5.1 Statistical Traffic Estimation 
In this subcategory of statistical-based algorithms, patterns of occurred alerts are rec-
ognized and the repetition pattern is derived and non-similarity with these patterns 
  
will be detected in the future. 
The goal of algorithms presented in [40], [41] and [42] is creating a statistical net-
work traffic model, predicting it, and removing predictable cases. An important cate-
gory of this kind of alerts contains alerts which occur periodically, due to wrong net-
work or security system adjustments. These algorithms do not need any context 
knowledge and all of their activities are carried out based on the statistics of each 
alert. According to this point that each of these filters is defined on a certain alert 
domain (according to choices made by the system supervisor), parallelism is easily 
possible in this application and before processing, and the alert processing unit can be 
easily specified. The processing load of this algorithm completely depends on the 
used statistical model, but all models presented in previous researches had linear and 
less processing load. The algorithm requirement of data set is determined based on the 
model time depth, but due to the use of only statistical information, storing or access-
ing real alerts is not necessary and only the relatively low and constant memory ca-
pacity is necessary. All presented statistical models in mentioned researches include 
online training and thus, compatibility with current conditions and flexibility based on 
new changes, are completely possible. 
Also, the algorithms described in [43], [44] and [45] are expressed based on Asso-
ciation Rules for detecting alerts which normally occur together. An important appli-
cation of this method is determining alert priorities based on this that which alerts 
have occurred together and have these accompaniments occurred on a usual procedure 
or a new pattern is observed, but also this algorithm can be used for creating related 
meta-alerts. Training is carried out offline in this algorithm and it is done in a time 
other than the execution time, but it can update model parameters in the run time and 
optimize the model according to new data. This algorithm does not need environmen-
tal knowledge and knowledge base and makes decision completely based on alert 
statistics. The algorithm requirement amount to memory is determined based on activ-
ity time window and windows are defined separately. In each window, statistical in-
formation about all alerts is calculated and the resulted statistics are compared to pre-
vious ones. Based on the determined domain by the user for applying this algorithm, 
arrived data from different units can be pre-partitioned and thus alerts related to each 
unit can be processed independently and only in their own processing unit, and pro-
cessing in each unit is also very much  parallelizable according to the need of count-
ing different alert combinations.  
5.2 Causal Relation Estimation 
The purpose of this subcategory is finding alert sequence or association dominant 
patterns and using these patterns for detecting false cases, or proper combinations. 
Some of these algorithms are more proper for learning attack patterns and some for 
detecting false alerts or lost ones. 
Several works were introduced based on analyzing causal relationships between 
alerts according to assessing the impact amount of using an alert in predicting other 
occurrence statistics of an alert [46] [47] [48]. The goal of these algorithms is creating 
a possible model for determining correlation relationships between alerts. Using this 
  
model, alerts can be correlated without environmental knowledge, but gaining a pre-
cise and reliable model requires a huge amount of previous data about the attacks. The 
algorithm acts in two separate training and functional phases. Training is performed 
offline and it is performable on archive data and thus its relatively huge processing 
load does not create any problems for practice use. In the test phase, due to the use of 
previous data, the model processing load is not too much and it can be decreased very 
much using some optimizations. Due to the high dependency of the training algorithm 
to huge data amount, flexing the algorithm against new conditions is not much easy, 
but with the direct user interference in learned relationships in the training phase, the 
algorithm behavior can be changed fast. Extending the algorithm is also possible us-
ing more data and wider education.  
In [49], very simple algorithm for finding existing attack sequences is introduced. 
In this algorithm, first the possible attack graph is generated like previous algorithms 
and then, passed procedures in this graph are specifies in a set of previous stored 
alerts, and their correlation possibility is determined based on the cases that two steps 
of this graph have occurred in a row in real attacks [50]. In [51], an algorithm has 
been presented a completion of [49] idea by implementing it with Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM). A different feature of this algorithm is the possibility of defining the 
possibility of each scenario occurrence and performing each attack step based on pre-
vious steps. The knowledge of this algorithm is completely gained based on previous 
stored and categorized data and thus, training a strong Markov model requires a huge 
amount of data and correctly categorizing and specifying previous attacks. This style 
is focused on attacks with specified source and destinations, due to this input data are 
completely able of being partitioned for dividing the processing procedure into paral-
lel processors, but the processing is relatively centered and undividable in each unit. 
The flexibility of this algorithm against new conditions is very slow due to high de-
pendency to a huge amount of training data, but increasing it is possible a little by the 
direct interference of the system supervisor and changing Markov possibility table. 
For extending the algorithm, training with new labeled data is necessary. 
5.3 Reliability Degree Combination 
The goal of this subcategory is introducing an algorithm for combining reliability 
with completely similar alerts [52] [53]. In this type of algorithm, changing the relia-
bility to alerts is proposed based on equivalent alert repetitions. The goal is changing 
the importance\priority of an alert, based on its approval by other resources. The pre-
sented algorithms require a huge amount of labeled previous data for generating prob-
ability models. The main idea can be simplified by removing all possible processing 
details and only accept the amount of an alert repetition as a factor independent from 
alert importance and resource history. The main algorithm acts in two training and 
function phases and thus the relatively huge amount of processing load does not have 
any impact on speed in time. Also the algorithm speed in execution time is completely 
proper and from the order of O (1). Due to the independency of the algorithms process 
for alert clusters, input data are completely able of being partitioned and due to the 
high simplicity of the processing inside each cluster; there is no need of parallelism. 
  
Flexibility against new conditions is slow due to the need of training with a lot of 
data, but the reliability to different resource opinions can change by the direct inter-
ference of the system supervisor and changing the algorithm behavior in real time. In 
addition, extending the algorithm requires extending learning data. 
6 Comparison 
In this section, we compared different algorithms from different viewpoints. In Ta-
ble 1, we provided an overall comparison between three main categories of algo-
rithms. Also, Table 2 compared all subcategories based on various factors. Consider-
ing the surveyed literature, it is obvious that in case of detection accuracy, the second 
category either prerequisite/consequence or scenario is high and has noticeable differ-
ence with other categories. Beside the accuracy factor, all categories have their own 
advantages in case of algorithm capability. We cannot ignore any of the categories 
because of the condition, attack and sensor type. Thus, to solve this problem, usually a 
hybrid approach can be used. Considering the required memory and the computation 
power, it should be noticed that statistical-based algorithms and the first two subcate-
gories of similarity-based algorithms need average resources. But in the third subcate-
gory, requirement defer according to the taken clusters. Also in the prerequi-
site/consequence algorithm, while there is a need for high amount of memory, there is 
a little need for computation power. But in contrast to prerequisite/consequence, sce-
nario algorithms needs average resources. Another important point to be mentioned 
can be the weakness of statistical-based algorithm in which they have less flexibility 
and extendibility compared with the other categories. Also, algorithms in second cate-
gory are not parallelizable because of their inner type of behavior and if partitioned, 
they wound have much accuracy. 
Table 1. Overall comparison. 
Characteristic Similarity-based 
Knowledge-
based 
Statistical-
based 
Combining alerts from various sensors Yes Yes No 
Requiring Prior knowledge Yes Yes No 
Detecting false alerts Yes Yes Guessing 
Detecting multi-stage attacks Hardly Yes Guessing 
Find new attacks Yes No Yes 
Error rate Average Low High 
  
Table 2. Comparison based on different factors 
7 Conclusion and Future Work 
Regarding the analysis of many algorithms, it is necessary to take the advantages of 
different categories. As it is clear from the term “correlation”, the more abstract the 
system is in networks, the better perspective the network managers have. Using more 
correlation measurements in this section will face great number of Events per Second 
(EPS). As a result, it is very important to pay attention to computation power in de-
signing algorithms. To continue the research in future, we will take advantage of algo-
rithms in each category to design an algorithm which has the least possible computa-
tion power consumption and can process multi thousand EPS and also has an extend-
able and flexible design. 
References 
[1] Tjhai, G. C., Papadaki, M., Furnell, S. M., Clarke, N. L.: Investigating the Problem of IDS False 
Alarms: An Experimental Study Using Snort. In: Proceedings of the IFIP TC 11 23rd International 
Information Security Conference, pp. 253-267 (2008) 
[2] Pouget, F., Dacier, M.: Alert Correlation: Review of the state of the art. EURECOM, Technical 
Report, (2003) 
[3] Sadoddin, R., Ghorbani, A.: Alert correlation survey: Framework and techniques. In: Proceedings of 
ACM International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust: Bridge the Gap Between PST 
Technologies and Business Services (2006) 
H High 
A Average 
L Low 
AD Require Attack Definition 
AM Require Alert Meaning 
 
A
ccu
racy
 
Flexibility
 
E
xtendibility
 
R
eq
uired
 
M
em
o
ry
 
C
o
m
p
utatio
n
 
P
o
w
er
 
P
a
rallelizing
 
K
n
o
w
ledge
 
b
a
se
 
Sim
ilarity
-
based
 
Simple Rules A H H A A H - 
Hierarchical Rules A H H A A H AD 
Machine Learning (Decision Tree) A A A A A A - 
Machine Learning (Re-creation) A A A L H H - 
Machine Learning (Verification) A A A H H L - 
K
B
 
Prerequisites/Consequences H H H H L L AM 
Scenario H H H A A L H 
Statistical
-
b
ased
 
Statistical Traffic Estimation A H A L H H - 
Statistical Traffic Estimation (Association Rules) A L L A A A - 
Causal Relationship Estimation (Ganger Test) A L L A A H - 
Causal Relationship Estimation (Markov Model) A L L A A A - 
Reliability Degree Combination A L L A A H - 
  
[4] Al-Mamory, S. O., Zhang, H.: A survey on IDS alerts processing techniques. In: Proceeding of the 6th 
WSEAS International Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ISP), pp. 69-78 (2007) 
[5] Valdes, A., Skinner, K.: Probabilistic alert correlation. In: Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection 
(RAID), pp. 54-68 (2001) 
[6] Debar, H., Wespi, A.: Aggregation and correlation of intrusion-detection alerts. In: Recent Advances 
in Intrusion Detection (RAID), pp. 85-103 (2001) 
[7] Cuppens, F.: Managing alerts in a multi-intrusion detection environment. In: Proceedings of the 17th 
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) (2001) 
[8] Valeur, F., Vigna, G., Kruegel, C., Kemmerer, R. A.: Comprehensive approach to intrusion detection 
alert correlation. In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 146-
169 (2004) 
[9] Elshoush, H. T., Osman, I. M.: Intrusion Alert Correlation Framework: An Innovative Approach. In: 
In IAENG Transactions on Engineering Technologies, pp. 405-420 (2013) 
[10] Julisch, K.: Mining alarm clusters to improve alarm handling efficiency. In: Proceedings of 17th 
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), pp. 12-21 (2001) 
[11] Julisch, K.: Clustering intrusion detection alarms to support root cause analysis. In: ACM Journal 
Name, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 111-138 (2002) 
[12] Al-Mamory, S. O., Zhang, H.: IDS alerts correlation using grammar-based approach. In: Journal of 
Computer Virology, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 271-282 (2009) 
[13] Dain, O. M., Cunningham, R. K.: Building scenarios from a heterogeneous alert stream. In: 
Proceedings of IEEE workshop on Information Assurance and Security (2001) 
[14] Dain, O., Cunningham, R. K.: Fusing a heterogeneous alert stream into scenarios. In: Proceedings of 
ACM workshop on Data Mining for Security Applications, pp. 1-13 (2001) 
[15] Smith, R., Japkowicz, N., Dondo, M., Mason, P.: Using unsupervised learning for network alert 
correlation. In: Advances in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 308-319 (2008) 
[16] Smith, R., Japkowicz, N., Dondo, M.: Clustering using an autoassociator: A case study in network 
event correlation. In: Proceedings of the 17th IASTED International Conference on Parallel and 
Distributed Computing and Systems (2008) 
[17] Pietraszek, T., Tanner, A.: Data mining and machine learning towards reducing false positives in 
intrusion detection. In: Information Security, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 169-183 (2005) 
[18] Pietraszek, T.: Using adaptive alert classification to reduce false positives in intrusion detection. In: 
Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), pp. 102-124 (2004) 
[19] Templeton, S. J., Levitt, K.: A requires/provides model for computer attacks. In: Proceedings of the 
Workshop on New Security Paradigms, pp. 31-38 (2001) 
[20] Ning, P., Cui, Y.: An intrusion alert correlator based on pre-requisites of intrusions. (2002) 
[21] Ning, P., Cui, Y., Reeves, D. S.: Constructing attack scenarios through correlation of intrusion alerts. 
In: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 245-254 
(2002) 
[22] Ning, P., Cui, Y., Reeves, D. S., Xu, D.: Techniques and tools for analyzing intrusion alerts. In: ACM 
Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 274-318 (2004) 
  
[23] Cuppens, F., Autrel, F., Miege, A., Benferhat, S.: Correlation in an intrusion detection process. In: 
Proceedings SEcurite des communications sur internet (SECI), pp. 153-171 (2002) 
[24] Ning, P., Xu, D.: Learning attack strategies from intrusion alerts. In: Proceedings of the 10th ACM 
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pp. 200-209 (2003) 
[25] Ning, P., Cui, Y., Reeves, D. S.: Analyzing intensive intrusion alerts via correlation. In: Recent 
Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), pp. 74-94 (2002) 
[26] Ning, P., Cui, Y., Reeves, D. S., Xu, D.: Towards automating intrusion alert analysis. In: Workshop on 
Statistical and Machine Learning Techniques in Computer Intrusion Detection (2003) 
[27] Ning, P., Xu, D.: Hypothesizing and reasoning about attacks missed by intrusion detection systems. In: 
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 591-627 (2004) 
[28] Ning, P., Xu, D., Healey, C. G., Amant, R. S.: Building attack scenarios through integration of 
complementary alert correlation methods. In: Proceedings of the 11th Annual Network and Distributed 
System Security Symposium (NDSS) (2004) 
[29] Zhai, Y., Ning, P., Iyer, P., Reeves, D. S.: Reasoning about complementary intrusion evidence. In: 
20th Annual IEEE Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), pp. 39-48 (2004) 
[30] Wang, L., Liu, A., Jajodia, S.: An efficient and unified approach to correlating, hypothesizing, and 
predicting intrusion alerts. In: European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), 
pp. 247-266 (2005) 
[31] Wang, L., Liu, A., Jajodia, S.: Using attack graphs for correlating, hypothesizing, and predicting 
intrusion alerts. In: Computer Communications, vol. 29, no. 15, pp. 2917-2933 (2006) 
[32] Zali, Z., Hashemi M. R., Saidi H.: Real-Time Intrusion Detection Alert Correlation and Attack 
Scenario Extraction Based on the Prerequisite-Consequence Approach. In: The ISC International 
Journal of Information Security, vol. 4.2 (2013) 
[33] Cheung, S., Lindqvist, U., Fong, M. W.: Modelling multistep cyber-attacks for scenario recognition. 
In: DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, pp. 284-292 (2003) 
[34] Eckmann, S. T., Vigna, G., Kemmerer, R. A.: STATL: An attack language for state-based intrusion 
detection. In: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 10, no. 1/2, pp. 71-104 (2002) 
[35] Cuppens, F., Ortalo, R.: LAMBDA: A language to model a database for detection of attacks. In: 
Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), pp. 197-216 (2001) 
[36] Morin, B., Mé, L., Debar, H., Ducassé, M.: M2D2: A formal data model for IDS alert correlation. In: 
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), 
pp. 115-137 (2002) 
[37] Morin, B., Mé, L., Debar, H., Ducassé, M.: A logic-based model to support alert correlation in 
intrusion detection. In: Information Fusion, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 285-299 (2009) 
[38] Al-Mamory, S. O., Zhang, H.: Intrusion detection alarms reduction using root cause Analysis and 
clustering. In: Computer Communications, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 419-430 (2009) 
[39] Kabiri, P., Ghorbani, A. A.: A rule-based temporal alert correlation system. In: International Journal of 
Network Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 66-72 (2007) 
[40] Viinikka, J., Debar, H.: Monitoring IDS background noise using EWMA control charts and alert 
information. In: Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), pp. 166-187 (2004) 
  
[41] Viinikka, J., Debar, H., Mé, L., Séguier, R.: Time series modelling for IDS alert management. In: 
Proceedings of ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, pp. 102-
113 (2006) 
[42] Viinikka, J., Debar, H., Mé, L., Lehikoinen, A., Tarvainen, M.: Processing intrusion detection alert 
aggregates with time series modelling. In: Information Fusion, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 312-324 (2009) 
[43] Manganaris, S., Christensen, M., Zerkle, D., Hermiz, K.: A data mining Analysis of RTID alarms. In: 
Computer Networks, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 571-577 (2000) 
[44] Treinen, J., Thurimella, R.: A framework for the application of association rule mining in large 
intrusion detection infrastructures. In: Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), pp. 1-18 
(2006) 
[45] Ren, H., Stakhanova, N., Ghorbani, A.: An online adaptive approach to alert correlation. In: 
Proceeding of Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA), pp. 153-
172 (2010) 
[46] Lee, W., Qin, X.: Statistical causality Analysis of INFOSEC alert data. In: Managing Cyber Threats., 
pp. 101-127 (2003) 
[47] Qin, X., Lee, W.: Attack plan recognition and prediction using causal networks. In: 20th Annual 
Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), pp. 370-379 (2004) 
[48] Qin, X., Lee, W.: Discovering novel attack strategies from INFOSEC alerts. In: Data Warehousing 
and Data Mining Techniques for Cyber Security, pp. 109-157 (2007) 
[49] Geib, C. W., Goldman, R. P.: Plan recognition in intrusion detection systems. In: DARPA Information 
Survivability Conference and Exposition, pp. 46-55 (2001) 
[50] Dorigo, M., Maniezzo, V., Colorni, A.: Ant system: Optimization by a colony of cooperating agents. 
In: IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 29-41 (1996) 
[51] Ourston, D., Matzner, S., Stump, W., Hopkins, B.: Applications of hidden markov models to detecting 
multi-stage network attacks. In: Proceedings of the 36th Annual IEEE Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (2003) 
[52] Gu, G., Cardenas, A. A., Lee, W.: Principled reasoning and practical applications of alert fusion in 
intrusion detection systems. In: Proceedings of ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and 
Communications Security, pp. 136-147 (2008) 
[53] Siraj, A., Vaughn, R. B.: Multi-level alert clustering for intrusion detection sensor data. In: Annual 
Meeting of the North American on Fuzzy Information Processing Society (NAFIPS), pp. 748-753 
(2005) 
 
